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OPINION OF THE COURT

SCIRICA, Chief Judge.
In this civil rights action, defendant police officers appeal from the denial of
summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. We will reverse.
I. Background
Appellee/Plaintiff Gregory Mitchell alleges that appellants/defendants Matthew
Gale and Warren Obenski, officers in the Uwchlan Township Police Department, violated
his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they arrested him for the
alleged assault, false imprisonment, and harassment of co-worker Rhonda Morris.
Mitchell and Morris both worked for U.S. Airways, and they had previously dated
for a disputed period of time. Morris contends Mitchell lured her to his hotel room in
Exton, Pennsylvania, where he attempted to sexually assault her and repeatedly blocked
her escape. During this encounter, Morris learned that Mitchell had gained access to her
e-mail account, and following the incident, Morris alleges that Mitchell continued to
harass her by telephone, pager, and e-mail. Mitchell, on the other hand, contends Morris
spent the night at the hotel without incident, and he denies any subsequent harassment.
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Nearly a month later, Morris reported the alleged assault to Officer Obenski.
Based on a written statement provided by Morris, an interview with Morris, and his
review of the hotel register and phone records, Obenski prepared a criminal complaint
and an affidavit of probable cause, which were signed by a District Justice. A nonattorney employee at the District Attorney’s office advised Obenski that because Mitchell
lived in Maryland, the best way to arrest him would be to prepare an affidavit of due
diligence in support of a fugitive warrant. On this affidavit, Obenski did not indicate any
prior attempts to arrest Mitchell, as none were made. Instead, he indicated that Mitchell
would flee if notified of the charges, a conclusion he reached from his interview with
Morris. This affidavit and the arrest warrant were approved and signed by a District
Justice.
Gale’s involvement began when Obenski suffered a motorcycle accident, soon
after the preparation of the warrant. Gale followed instructions to pick up the signed
warrant and see that it was executed. Mitchell was subsequently arrested in Maryland and
transported back to Pennsylvania. Between awaiting extradition from Maryland to
Pennsylvania and before posting bail, Mitchell spent nearly two weeks in jail. The
prosecutor eventually reduced the charges against Mitchell from misdemeanors to
summary offenses, and he was found not guilty.
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Mitchell brought suit against Obenski and Gale 1 under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983,
and 1985,2 alleging a lack of probable cause and the improper obtaining of a fugitive
warrant. On the basis of qualified immunity, appellants moved for summary judgment,
which the District Court denied in a one-line order. Appellants have filed an immediate
appeal of that order.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have jurisdiction under the “collateral order” doctrine of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (holding that “a district court’s denial
of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an
appealable ‘final decision’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”). An order denying
summary judgment is immediately appealable where the defendant is a public official
asserting a claim of qualified immunity. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311 (1995); see
also Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 320 F.3d 409, 415 (3d Cir. 2003).

1

Mitchell also brought claims against Morris, which were severed from this suit.

2

The briefs to this Court as well as to the District Court focus almost exclusively on
Mitchell’s § 1983 claims. Appellants’ brief notes that Mitchell failed to address the §§
1981 and 1985 claims in his opposition to the motion for summary judgment. While
appellants contend this failure to oppose the motion on these grounds effectively
dismisses the claims, we do not need to address this question. Since these claims arise
from the same set of events as the § 1983 claim, a finding of qualified immunity
immunizes the officers against all three.
4

Although the District Court summarily dismissed appellants’ summary judgement
motion in a one-line order,3 the motion was predicated on a defense of qualified

immunity. Our review of the record reveals that the facts underlying the officers’ actions
are not in dispute. Therefore we exercise plenary review to determine whether, in light of
these facts, appellants are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law. Schieber, 320
F.3d at 415 (3d Cir. 2003).
III. Analysis
In Saucier v. Katz, the Supreme Court held that, for qualified immunity claims, a
court must first determine whether there is a constitutional right that would have been
violated assuming the facts alleged. Second, it must determine whether this right was
clearly established such that the defendant was on notice that his actions constituted a
violation. 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); see also Forbes, 313 F.3d at 148 (3d Cir. 2002);
Bennett v. Murphy, 274 F.3d 133, 136-37 (3d Cir. 2001). Whether a right is clearly
established and whether an officer acted reasonably are questions of law. Bartholomew v.
Pennsylvania, 221 F.3d 425, 428 (3d Cir. 2000).
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We reiterate the supervisory rule issued in Forbes v. Township of Lower Merion,
requiring that “future dispositions of a motion in which a party pleads qualified immunity
include, at minimum, an identification of relevant factual issues and an analysis of the law
that justifies the ruling with respect to those issues.” 313 F.3d 144, 149 (3d Cir. 2002).
5

A. Probable Cause for Mitchell’s Arrest

There is a Fourth Amendment right to be free from arrest without probable cause,
and this right is clearly established. See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563-64
(2004); Saucier, 533 U.S. at 207-08 (2001). The only question, therefore, is whether a
reasonable officer would have believed there was probable cause to arrest Mitchell.
“The qualified immunity standard gives ample room for mistaken judgments by
protecting all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (citation omitted); see also Sharrar v.
Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 826 (3d Cir. 1997). More specifically, an officer’s affidavit
supporting a search warrant is presumptively valid. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
171-72 (1978). This presumption also applies to arrest warrants. See, e.g., Wilson v.
Russo, 212 F.3d 781, 786 (3d Cir. 2000). We apply the standard of objective
reasonableness set forth in United States v. Leon, which held that “[i]n the ordinary case,
an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate’s probable-cause determination.
. . . [O]nce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in
seeking to comply with the law.” 468 U.S. 897, 921 (1984) (citation omitted).
In this case, Obenski’s affidavit of probable cause was based on his reliance on
Morris’ statements and the hotel records. We have held that it is reasonable for officers
to assess a complainant’s “demeanor, find her story credible, and rely on her subsequent
identification of . . . the attacker. When a police officer has received a reliable
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identification by a victim of his or her attacker, the police have probable cause to arrest.”
Sharrar, 128 F.3d. at 818 (3d Cir. 1997). Obenski might have taken further steps, such
as interviewing Mitchell before arresting him, or he might have approached Morris’s
account with more skepticism. But the mere fact that a police investigation could have
been more thorough does not vitiate probable cause. Morris presented Obenski with a
credible, consistent account of sexual assault that was supported in part by hotel records.
Furthermore, the fact that a District Justice signed the warrant entitles Obenski to a
presumption of reasonableness that can only be overcome by “allegations of deliberate
falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth,” which must be accompanied by specific
proof. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171 (1978). “Only where the warrant application is ‘so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
unreasonable[]’ will the officer lose the shield of immunity.” Orsatti v. N.J. State Police,
71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
Mitchell does not offer any proof of deliberate falsehood by Obenski, and Obenski’s
actions surpass the Orsatti standard.
For these reasons, we hold that a reasonable officer in Obenski’s position would
have believed that probable cause to arrest Mitchell existed, and at the very least, that it
would not have been clear to a reasonable officer that probable cause was lacking. As
such, Obenski is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions.
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B. Designation of Mitchell as a Fugitive
Mitchell also contends Obenski improperly designated him a fugitive. Even if we
assume, arguendo, that designation as a fugitive implicates a clearly established
constitutional right, Mitchell’s contention still fails. Mitchell argues he was not a
fugitive because he did not leave Pennsylvania to evade the law. But appellants are
correct that “fugitive” status does not turn on the subjective intentions of the accused.
The Supreme Court held nearly a century ago that “all that is necessary to convert a
criminal . . . into a fugitive from justice is that he should have left the State after having
incurred guilt there.” Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911); see also Gee v.
Kansas, 912 F.2d 414, 418 (10th Cir. 1990) (“A fugitive from justice is a person who is
1) suspected of or has been convicted of committing a crime, 2) sought by the
jurisdiction so that the jurisdiction may subject the person to its criminal justice system,
and 3) has left the jurisdiction and is found within the boundaries of another.”) (citations
omitted); Moncrief v. Anderson, 342 F.2d 902, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (“Fugitivity means
presence in the demanding state when the crime was allegedly committed.”). After
Mitchell had allegedly violated the law in Pennsylvania, he left the state. Therefore, it
was not unreasonable for Obenski to designate Mitchell as a fugitive for the purposes of
arrest.
The case law also supports appellants’ argument that the designation of Mitchell
as a fugitive did not implicate any separate, clearly established constitutional right. Some
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courts of appeals have outright rejected alleged constitutional violations in the context of
the arrest and extradition of fugitives. See, e.g., Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1299
(6th Cir. 1997) (holding that there is no protected individual right to compliance with
formal extradition procedures, and that “even if such a right did exist, it certainly was not
a clearly established right at the time of [the] arrest.”); Ortega v. City of Kansas City, 875
F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir. 1989) (“a criminal suspect has no pre-arrest extradition rights,
the violation of which give rise to a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”). Mitchell
provides no legal support for the existence of a right not to be designated as a fugitive,
and at the very least, such a right was not clearly established.
Mitchell also contends that Obenski’s affidavit of due diligence in support of the
fugitive warrant was false. But he provides no evidence of any misrepresentation.
Obenski simply noted on the affidavit that it was his belief, based on his discussion with
Morris, that Mitchell might attempt to flee if notified of the charges, and that he had been
advised by the District Attorney’s office to request such a warrant. The District Justice’s
approval of the warrant lends further support to the reasonableness of Obenski’s course
of action.
For these reasons, Obenski is entitled to qualified immunity for his actions in
obtaining the fugitive warrant.
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C. Officer Gale’s Involvement
The Supreme Court has held that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is individual
and requires evidence of personal involvement in a constitutional violation. Rizzo v.
Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976) (rejecting respondeat superior liability under § 1983);
see also Heggenmiller v. Edna Mahan Corr. Inst. for Women, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS
6067, at *10 (3d Cir. Apr. 11, 2005) (rejecting the § 1983 claims of prisoners against
supervisory prison officials for the conduct of certain prison guards); Bieregu v. Reno, 59
F.3d 1445, 1448 n.1 (3d Cir. 1995) (“to be liable for a constitutional violation a
defendant must have some causal connection to the wrongdoing”).
The wrongdoing Mitchell asserts is a failure to show probable cause to support an
arrest warrant and the improper designation of Mitchell as a fugitive – he makes no
claims about the actual execution of the warrant. But Gale played no part in obtaining
the warrant. Even if we assume, arguendo, that there were actionable defects in the
manner in which Obenski obtained the warrant, Gale is not liable for executing a warrant
prepared by another officer and signed by a judge.
Given both the individual nature of § 1983 liability and the reasonableness of
Gale’s actions, he is entitled to qualified immunity.
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IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the decision of the District Court, and
we will remand the matter with instructions to grant appellants’ motion for summary
judgment.
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